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Abstract
The authors apply the asset-valuation model developed by Rabinovitch (1989) to six publicly
traded Canadian banks over the period 1982–2002. The model is an extension of the Merton
(1977a) option-pricing model with the incorporation of stochastic interest rates. The authors
introduce the Z-score, a measure of distance-to-default, which can be a useful tool for regulators
in assessing the risk of bank failures. The Z-scores, overall, suggest that Canadian banks are far
from the point of default. The authors also ﬁnd that both the market valuation of the bank assets
and the Z-score of the Canadian banks demonstrate similar regime shifts in the late 1990s, which
may be related to regulatory changes during the 1990s.
JEL classiﬁcation: G12, G21
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial institutions
Résumé
Pour la période allant de 1982 à 2002, les auteurs appliquent à six banques canadiennes inscrites
en bourse le modèle d’évaluation des actifs proposé par Rabinovitch (1989). Ce modèle reprend la
formule d’évaluation des options de Merton (1977a) en y intégrant des taux d’intérêt
stochastiques. Les auteurs présentent une mesure de la distance qui sépare une banque donnée
d’un défaut de paiement — le score Z —  dont les autorités réglementaires pourraient se servir
pour apprécier le risque de défaillance des établissements bancaires. Dans l’ensemble, les
scores Z obtenus indiquent que les banques canadiennes sont éloignées du point de défaillance.
Les auteurs observent en outre des changements de régime analogues dans les séries relatives à la
valeur marchande des actifs et au score Z des banques durant la deuxième moitié des
années 1990, lesquels pourraient être attribuables aux modiﬁcations apportées à la réglementation
au courant de cette décennie.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G12, G21
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Institutions ﬁnancières1
1. Introduction
Bank failures are costly to an insurer of deposits and to other member institutions in a deposit
insurance program. From the inception of the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) in
1967 to March 2001, there were 43 failures of member institutions, with losses to CDIC of about
$7 billion, or 15 per cent of the face value of the insured deposits of those institutions.1 In more
extreme situations, a failing bank could cause panic in the banking system and trigger runs in
other ﬁnancial institutions, creating a ﬁnancial crisis, where the adverse impact on the ﬁnancial
system would be felt in other parts of the economy.
Regulators traditionally rely on accounting statements to monitor the ﬁnancial health of banks.
Accounting data, however, are not issued frequently, and they have a signiﬁcant time lag.
Moreover, there may be an incentive for a failing bank to disguise its true state from regulators
and the ﬁnancial market. For example, the external auditors of the two bank failures in recent
Canadian history, Canadian Commercial Bank and the Northland Bank, were persuaded by
management to accept accounting statements about which they had serious concerns (Binhammer
and Sephton 1998). This is less likely to occur today, because regulation and supervision in the
ﬁnancial service sector have improved. Nevertheless, accounting data are still prone to
manipulation by the reporting institution and valuable information can be lost.
Information derived from market prices can be more accurate, frequent, and timely than that
derived from other sources. Recent literature has argued that market price data should be used to
assess the risk of bank failures. For example, Laeven (2002) uses market price data from banks in
East Asia to estimate the costs of insuring a bank’s deposits, and he uses this estimate as a
measure of bank risk. Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2002) show that an unbiased equity-based
fragility indicator, a Z-score, can be derived from a Black-Scholes (1973) type of option-pricing
model and predict bank defaults more accurately than bank subordinated-debt spread and
traditional CAMEL2 type indicators. Giammarino, Schwartz, and Zechner (1989) calculate the
market value of assets for Canadian banks using an option-pricing model and ﬁnd that there is a
signiﬁcant difference between a bank’s market value and its book value. This difference is found
to largely increase prior to a bank’s bankruptcy.
This paper revisits the market valuation of Canadian banks and proposes a measure of distance-to-
default, the Z-score, which can be used to assess the risk of bank failures on a timely basis. Our Z-
score is a potential improvement over the one commonly used in the literature (proposed by
1. Based on CDIC annual reports.
2. CAMEL: Credit, Asset, Management, Equity, and Liquidity.2
Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes 2002), because it takes into account the stochastic interest rate risk,
which is an important risk that ﬁnancial institutions face. The model is based on the Rabinovitch
(1989) option-pricing model, which is an extension of the Merton (1977a) model. Duan, Moreau,
and Sealey (1995) decompose the bank risk into interest rate risk and non-interest rate risk based
on this model. We apply the model to six publicly traded Canadian banks over the period 1982–
2002. Our study is the ﬁrst we know of to apply such methods to Canadian banks.
We ﬁnd that Canadian banks have a very high Z-score (very low insolvency risk), judging by the
standard in the literature, except in 1982 and 1983. Moreover, asset volatility has decreased over
time and most of this can be attributed to interest rate risk, except for the period 1998–2002. We
also ﬁnd that the market value of bank assets is almost always below its book value. The
difference between the two narrowed considerably in the late 1990s. The evolution of the Z-score
demonstrates a similar regime shift in that period—the insolvency risk signiﬁcantly decreased.
This market-perceived reduction in the banks’ default risk might be due to the regulatory changes
that took place during the 1990s.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model and the
Z-score. Section 3 provides empirical results. Section 4 offers some conclusions. The appendix
solves the model for the asset value of a bank.
2. Theoretical Model
The theoretical model is based on Merton’s (1977a) option-pricing model with stochastic interest
rates. This section ﬁrst describes how a bank’s equity is modelled as a call option. Next, we
introduce a stochastic interest rate process into the option-pricing model. We then show how the
model can be used to distinguish interest rate risk from non-interest rate risk. After the model is
solved, we introduce the Z-score, or distance-to-default.
2.1 Modelling bank equity as a call option
According to Black and Scholes (1973), it is possible to interpret a bank’s equity as a call option
on the bank’s assets. Consider a bank with a planning horizon equal to [0,T ] 3. The bank acquires
an asset portfolio at time t = 0, and ﬁnances it with a deposit liability of face value L, which
matures at time t = T. Assuming a compounded interest rate, R, the liability to depositors is LeRT
at time t=T . When the liability matures, shareholders of the bank can either “repurchase” it from
3. This time interval canbe assumed to be one year, the frequency at which banks issue their annual
reports.3
the depositors by making required interest and principal payments, or relinquish ownership to the
depositors or other creditors of the bank. Thus, the equity of the bank (E) can be considered as a
call option on the bank’s assets with an exercise price of LeRT, the payoff of which can be
described as:
where V is the market value of the bank’s assets. With deposit insurance, R is equal to some risk-
free government bond rate and equation (1) can be rewritten as
where l is the closure rule of the regulatory authorities, and 0 < l < 1. When l = 1, the regulatory
authorities declare the bank bankrupt as soon as the value of its liabilities is higher than that of its
assets. The lower l is, the further regulators would allow the value of the bank’s assets to fall
below its liabilities before it is declared bankrupt.
2.2 Introducing a stochastic interest rate
In many models of option pricing, a constant risk-free interest rate is assumed (e.g., see Black and
Scholes 1973, Cox 1975, Geske 1979, Johnson and Shanno 1987, and Hull and White 1987). This
assumption ignores the correlation between the risk-free rate and the value of the bank’s assets
and equity. In a model applied to banks, the balance sheets of which are highly leveraged, this
assumption can be particularly problematic. During periods of volatile interest rates, banks are
more likely to experience mismatches between the durations of their assets and liabilities, and
thus are more likely to be insolvent.4
Merton (1973) assumes that the price of a default-free discount bond is a function of a stochastic
interest rate. His model simpliﬁes to the Black and Scholes (1973) model in the special case of a
constant risk-free rate. Similar to Rabinovitch (1989) and Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1995), we
adopt Merton’s approach and assume that the interest rate follows a stochastic process described
by Vasicek (1977). The instantaneous interest rate is assumed to be mean-reverting, as follows,
4. Although banks are often well-hedged against interest risk.
Em a x 0 VL e
RT – , () = (1) ,
Em a x 0 V lLe
RT – , () = (2) ,4
where rt is the instantaneous risk-free rate of interest at time t, m is the long-run mean of the
interest rate, v is the interest rate volatility, q is the converging speed of the interest rate towards its
long-run equilibrium, and  is a standard Wiener process.
2.3 Interest risk and non-interest risk
Similarly, the total value of the bank’s assets is speciﬁed as follows,
where Vt is the value of the bank’s assets at time t, m is the expected return on the bank’s assets, sV
is the total volatility of returns on the bank’s assets, and is a Wiener process. sVis assumed to
be inﬂuenced by the interest rate risk; thus, and are correlated. Duan, Moreau, and Sealey
(1995) show that  can be decomposed into a component relating to  and another
orthogonal component, , through a projection exercise, where Wt is a Wiener process. More
speciﬁcally,
where .
Substituting equation (5) into (3) leads to
Using the expression of  based on equation (3), we have,
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where  and .  can be interpreted as the instantaneous
interest rate elasticity of the bank’s assets, and  is the component of asset volatility that is
contributed by the interest rate risk. Similarly, y2 is the volatility of the bank’s assets caused by all
risk that is orthogonal to the interest rate risk.
2.4 Distance-to-default
Next, we deﬁne a measure of the distance-to-default, the Z-score, which measures the market
value of a bank’s assets in relation to the book value of its liabilities. Our deﬁnition of the Z-score
is similar to the one proposed by KMV Corporation (1993) and Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2002),
based on an option-pricing model,5 although our Z-score differs by taking into account the
interest rate risk. It is therefore more relevant for banks than the existing Z-scores. Speciﬁcally,
where
Equation (8) shows that the Z-score is determined by three variables: l, sV, and Et/Vt. The
parameter l is related to the deposit insurance program. Et/Vt can be considered a risk-based
capital measure, as required by the market. The denominator sV can be decomposed into interest
rate risk and non-interest rate risk.
Simply looking at the formula of the Z-distance, we can see that a more forgiving closure rule (a
smaller value of l) can increase the value of Z, which for the market makes the bank appear
further from insolvency. In the meantime, a higher Et/Vt ratio has the same effect. This implies
5. There are many other ways to construct theZ-score. For example, Altman (1977, 1993) computes the
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that a more stringent capital standard is qualitatively equivalent to a more lenient closure rule in
regard to the market’s perception of the insolvency risk of a ﬁnancial institution. However, l is
exogenous to the bank; i.e., the regulator and all other agents in the economy have to bear the
costs of a lenient rule, whereas the bank has control over its capital adequacy. More importantly,
viewed in a dynamic context, a more lenient closure rule (a smaller l) can generate a moral
hazard, which leads to increased risk-taking and the increased probability of future failures. An
increase in the total business risk, sV, leads to a lower value of Z, which means a higher risk of
insolvency. Recall that sV consists of interest rate risk and non-interest rate risk.
2.5  How does interest rate volatility affect the Z-score?
Before we apply the model to Canadian banks, we examine the properties of the model for a
hypothetical bank, calibrated as follows. For the stochastic interest rate process, we use the
parameter estimates from Ait-Sahalia (1996), where q = 0.86, m = 0.089, and v2 = 0.002154. l is
set to 0.95, as in Giammarino, Schwartz, and Zechner (1989). The interest rate elasticity of equity
fE has a range of –1 to –6, according to Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1995). We set the value of fE
to be –2. The volatility of equity is set to be 0.25. We set T = 1, assuming that the bank’s planning
horizon is a year.
Our sensitivity test studies the model’s response to a change in the interest rate volatility. As Table
1 shows, a rise in v increases asset volatility, sV (total risk), and the interest rate elasticity of
assets, fV, which implies that interest rate risk accounts for a disproportionately large part of the
increase in total asset volatility. As a result, the non-interest rate risk decreases slightly. On the
other hand, the interest rate elasticity of liability is unchanged, since, under the model’s
assumption, the default-free bond that represents the liability of the bank pays zero-coupon
interest. Thus, the net impact of the mismatch in the interest rate risk exposure is a wider elasticity
gap and duration gap. Not surprisingly, the Z-score is lower.
3. Empirical Results
We apply the above theoretical model to the “big six” Canadian chartered banks that are publicly
traded: the Royal Bank, the Bank of Montreal, CIBC, TD Canada Trust, the Bank of Nova Scotia,
and the National Bank. We set q equal to one, as suggested by Chan et al. (1992) and used by
Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1995), and we calculate v as the standard deviation of the daily 90-day7
treasury bill rate over the year prior to the end of the month.6 Following the calibrated model, we
set T = 1 and l = 0.95. E is the daily market capitalization of each bank, taken from DataStream.
 is estimated by regressing the daily return of the bank’s equity on the change in daily 90-day
treasury bill returns in the previous year. Similarly,  is the standard deviation of the market
capitalization of each bank in the same period. L is the book value of the liability of the banks,
taken from the quarterly report of each bank. The model is evaluated monthly, from June 1982 to
December 2002.
3.1 Market valuation of banks
We calculate the market valuation of the assets of each bank. Figure 1 shows the average ratio of
the market value to book value (market-to-book ratio) for the big six banks, weighted according to
their asset size. We can see that the market value of a bank can be substantially lower than its book
value. The market-to-book ratio typically lies between 94 and 99 per cent in our sample period of
1982 to 2002. This ﬁnding is similar to that by Giammarino, Schwartz, and Zechner (1989), who
show that the industry average market-to-book ratio is between 95 and 97 per cent in the period
from 1981 to 1985. This seems to suggest that the market systematically discounts the book value
of a bank’s assets.
There seems to be some evidence of regime shifting in the evolution of the market-to-book ratio in
the latter half of the 1990s. Prior to 1996, for example, the market-to-book ratio moves within the
range of 94 to 96 per cent. The ratio rises to more than 100 per cent in about 18 months, and then
it drops by three percentage points in August 1998, during a sharp increase in short-term interest
rates and a general price decline in the stock market. This rapid decline in the market-to-book
ratio may reﬂect the market’s perception of an increased level of interest rate risk and a general
decrease in the value of ﬁrms (a bursting of the “bubble”). Afterwards, the ratio steadily rises and
stays in the 98 to 99 per cent range from the beginning of 1999 to 2002.
The possible regime shifts coincide with regulatory innovations in the ﬁnancial safety net, which
may have helped improve the market’s perception of the banks’ soundness. In 1996, the Ofﬁce of
the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) was given the power (through amendments of
the various ﬁnancial-institution acts) to take control of the assets of an institution, without having
6. Ideally, we would like to use estimates ofqand vbased on equation (3). Using a conditional least-
squares method, however, we obtain many non-converging results, in whichqv < 1, a necessary
condition for equation (3) to yield a mean-reverting process. This is not surprising, given that Chan et
al.(1992)showthattheVasicek(1977)modelperformspoorlyinmatchingrealinterestratedata.Asa
result, we follow Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1995) and assume that interest rates are deterministic.
Ronn and Verma (1986) show that their estimates of asset volatility are almost identical when using
deterministic and stochastic interest rates.
fE
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to prove that it is insolvent.7 When OSFI has taken control of an institution’s assets, it may take all
necessary measures to protect the interests of the institution’s depositors and creditors. Other
regulatory changes, such as the introduction of the Prompt Corrective Action in the mid-1990s,
further formalized the supervisory options available to OSFI and CDIC to respond to a troubled
institution. In 1999, OSFI introduced a procedural risk-based supervisory approach that focuses
on evaluating an institution’s material risks and the quality of its risk-management practices.
These steps towards improved supervisory incentives and increased supervisory powers may have
sent a signal to market participants that banks are under closer supervision, and thus are making
better decisions. Furthermore, the market may have believed that, if an institution was in trouble,
remedial supervisory intervention would be more prompt. These signals may have helped
improve the market valuation of banks’ assets.
3.2 Interest rate and non-interest rate risks
Figure 2 shows the weighted average of the total asset volatility (total risk) of the big six banks
and its decomposition into interest rate risk and non-interest rate risk. The highest asset volatility
occurs over the period 1982–83, when interest rate volatility was at a record high. Indeed, our
model shows that interest rate risk accounts for almost all asset volatility over the period 1982–83,
beyond which time the total risk of banks seems to have continually decreased, particularly since
1998. The share of interest rate risk has also decreased since the end of 1998. On the one hand, the
decrease in the total risk may be related to the market response to the regulatory changes
discussed above. On the other hand, the increase in the share of the non-interest rate risk over the
period 1998–2002 may be related to the banks’ exposure to the stock market and to certain high-
risk corporate sectors. The stock market experienced tremendous volatility over that period,
creating large ﬂuctuations in the banks’ trading and transaction income as well as in some fee-
based income related to market activities, such as underwriting fees and security commissions.
The ﬁnancial problems in certain corporate sectors over the period 1998–2002, notably in the
high-tech sector, also may have contributed to a higher non-interest risk through a large amount of
loan losses and loss provisions.
3.3 Distance-to-default
Figure 3 shows the weighted average of the Z-score of the big six banks. Overall, Canadian banks
have a very high Z-score (or very low insolvency risk). Although the commonly adopted threshold
for identifying troubled ﬁrms is between 1.5 and 2 (Calmès 2004, Altman 1977), the Z-score of
7. See David and Pelly (1997), and Government of Canada (2001a, b).9
Canadian banks is typically much higher than that. An exception occurs in 1982, when, on
average, the big six produced a Z-score of around 2, a level considered high risk. This may reﬂect
several adverse factors that the banks faced simultaneously: the recession, the fallout from the
less-developed countries’ (LDC) debt crisis, and the record high volatility of interest rates.
Several other turning points of the Z-score also seem to correspond to important macroeconomic
events: the economic slowdowns at the end of 1986, end of 1995, mid-1998, and end of 2001; the
recession at the beginning of 1991; and the “Black Thursday” stock crash of 1987. Figure 4 plots
the Z-score against real annualized quarter-over-quarter GDP growth. Although the two measures
may not be highly correlated at the level, the Z-score seems to match well the turning points in the
economy.
The regime shifts that we observed in the market valuation of bank assets also seem to be evident
in the evolution of the Z-score. As stated in section 2, three factors contribute to the movements in
the Z-score: l, E/V, and sV. l is assumed to be constant. The structural increases in the market-to-
book ratio in 1996 and 1999 imply a higher market-based capital ratio (E/V). A decrease in the
volatility of assets over time, particularly in the late 1990s, also contributes to a higher Z-score in
that period.8
4. Conclusion
We have applied the Rabinovitch (1989) option-pricing model to six publicly traded Canadian
banks over the period 1982 to 2002. The market valuation of bank assets is derived from this
model. The model also allows the bank risk to be decomposed into interest rate risk and non-
interest rate risk. We introduced a measure of distance-to-default, the Z-score, which can be
useful in assessing the risk of bank failures.
We have found that the market value of a bank’s assets almost always lies below its book value.
This ﬁnding is similar to that by other researchers. The market-to-book ratio shows evidence of
regime shifts in 1996 and 1999. These structural breaks correspond to regulatory innovations that
occurred in those periods, which may have helped improve the market’s perception of the
insolvency risk of Canadian banks. We also found that Canadian banks have a very high Z-score
(very low insolvency risk), judging by the standard in the literature, except over the 1982–83
period. Similar to the regime shifts observed in the market-to-book ratio, the industry Z-score
8. We assumel to be constant throughout the model.lis likely to have increased, because the
supervisors are given more power overtroubled institutions at an earlier stage; i.e., a tighter closure
rule may have been imposed. Implemented in a mechanical fashion, this could lead toa lower Z, or
higher insolvency risk. This kindof regulatory change, however, establishes incentives that will
generally reduce insolvency risk.10
improved signiﬁcantly in the late 1990s. Moreover, asset volatility decreased over time and most
of it can be attributed to the interest rate risk, except for the period 1998–2002, when the non-
interest rate risk increased signiﬁcantly.
There are many possible extensions to our work. For example, we have assumed that equity
volatility is deterministic; more work can be done to extend the model to incorporate stochastic
equity volatility, similar to that proposed by Hull and White (1987). One could also use a more
forward-looking measure of equity volatility, such as the volatility derived from a Black-Scholes
(1973) type option-pricing model.11
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Interest rate volatility n = 0.0464 *0.9 *1.0 *1.1
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    Non-market risk y 0.0215 0.0212 0.0209
    Interest rate elast. of liability B(T) 0.6707 0.6707 0.6707
    Interest rate elast. of asset fV –0.7920 –0.7922 –0.7926
    Elast. gap fV + B(T) –0.1212 –0.1215 –0.1219
    Prob. of insolvency 1 - N(h - d) 0.0032 0.0052 0.0083
Market-based capital-adequacy ratio
E/V 0.0909 0.0910 0.0910
Distance from insolvency
    Z-score 2.2952 2.1300 1.9788
   Elast. of Z to market risk, Zn 33.6518 32.3228 30.9135
   Elast. of Z to non-market risk, Zy 27.6304 23.5516 20.163514
Graph 1: Weighted Average of Market-to-Book Ratio of Asset of the Big Six Banks*
* Weighted according to asset size
Figure 1: Weighted Average of Market-to-Book Ratio of Assets, Big Six Banks*
*Weighted according to asset size
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Figure 2: Big Six Banks: Decomposition of Asset Variance*
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Graph 3: Weighted Average of Z-score of the Big Six Banks*
* Weighted according to asset size
Figure 3: Weighted Average of Z-score, Big Six Banks*
*Weighted according to asset size
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Figure 4: Z-score of Big Six vs. Output Growth
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Appendix:  Solving the Model for the Asset Value of a Bank
Vasicek (1977) shows that the price at time t of a zero-coupon bond that pays $1 at time T is:
where A(T–t) and B(T–t) are functions of the time to maturity of the bond,
where –B(T–t) is the interest rate elasticity of the bond price. Recall that the liabilities of a bank
can be modelled as a zero-coupon bond maturing at t=T . Thus, –B(T–t) is the interest rate elastic-
ity of bank liabilities. Recall that  is the interest rate elasticity of the bank’s assets. Thus,
is the interest rate elasticity gap and the negative of this term is equivalent to the
bank’s duration gap.
Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1995) show that, because the assets and liabilities of a bank have
interest rate elasticities of  and –B(T–t), respectively, the interest rate elasticity of the bank’s
equity value is,
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fEt Wt fV BT t – () + [] BT t – () – =               (A4) ,17
where
is the standard option elasticity.
Let  denote the equity volatility at time t. Then,
The bank’s equity valuation is, therefore,
where
Given T, q, v, l,, , E, and L, the asset value of the bank, Vt, the interest rate elasticity of V,
, and the measure of non-interest risk, , can be obtained by solving the system of equations
consisting of (A2), (A4), (A5), (A6), (A7), (A8), and (A9).
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